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 JOHN GIBBONS
 IDENTITY WITHOUT SUPERVENIENCE
 (Received 1 April, 1992)
 In this paper, I am primarily interested in the connection between
 relational, or externalist, descriptions of content-bearing mental events
 on the one hand, and the question of whether or not the events referred
 to by these descriptions are in any sense external to the individual to
 whom they are ascribed. I will argue that when we talk about a para-
 diginatic type of mental event, occurrent thoughts, we use descriptions
 involving relational properties of the event ("content properties") but
 the event referred to is purely internal to the individual. If content
 properties are relational but nonessential features of mental events, we
 have the possibility of token physicalism without the supervenience of
 content properties on internal physical properties. Thoughts are neuro-
 logical events, but content properties do not supervene on neurological
 properties. And though our ordinary identification of thoughts is in
 terms of their content, what makes a thought the event that it is may not
 be a matter of its having that content. Making sense of this view is the
 project of this paper.
 I am interested in defending a version of nonreductive materialism.
 Since Davidson,1 one of the most common ways of formulating non-
 reductive materialism is in terms of events. Every mental event is a
 physical event, but mental properties are not physical properties and
 are not reducible to physical properties. Since it is so common, I will
 adopt this formulation. But this is not to say that there cannot be other
 formulations of nonreductive materialism, even with an ontology that
 does not admit events. To adopt this formulation of nonreductive
 materialism, however, is not to adopt any particular conception of
 events. We will return to this question below. Also following Davidson,
 I will assume that a mental event is an event that has a true description
 containing a mental predicate.2 I also assume that we can spot mental
 vocabulary when we see it. For example, any event description con-
 Philosophical Studies 70: 59-79, 1993.
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 taiming a verb of propositional attitude refers to a mental event if it
 refers at all. Finally, I will assume that it makes sense to speak of the
 essential and accidental properties of events. The event of my writing
 this paper could have been the very same event even if it had taken
 place in a room whose walls were painted a slightly darker color. It
 could not, however, have been an event which consisted of someone
 else playing tennis. I will not here be arguing for any essentialist claim,
 but I do need to assume that the distinction makes sense.
 In "Individualism and the Mental,"3 Tyler Burge is primarily concerned
 with showing that social factors are relevant to the determination of the
 contents of our thoughts. He presents a by now familiar thought
 experiment in which we imagine holding constant the internal physical
 properties of an individual while the contents of the person's thoughts
 differ because of differences in the way other people use the language.
 In addition to presenting and defending this argument for the relevance
 of social factors for the determination of content, Burge also draws
 various consequences from this view. In particular, he presents an
 argument against any version of physicalism which attempts to identify
 content-bearing mental events with physical events in an individual.
 Here is a reconstruction of that argument:4
 (1) Let "b" rigidly designate the physical (neural) event cor-
 related with Oscar's thought that he has arthritis in the thigh.
 (2) In the counterfactual situation, b occurs but Oscar does not
 have any thought with the content that he has arthritis in the
 thigh.
 (3) If a thought has a certain content in a possible world, then it
 has that same content in every world in which it exists or
 occurs.
 (4) If b were Oscar's thought that he has arthritis in the thigh,
 then it would occur in the counterfactual situation without
 having the content that he has arthritis in the thigh, con-
 tradicting (3).
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 (5) Therefore, b is not Oscar's thought that he has arthritis in
 the thigh.
 There are, essentially, two ways around this argument: focus on (2),
 or focus on (3). Premise (1) is a stipulation, and (4) simply explains
 how the first three premises entail the conclusion. It is logically super-
 fluous. The obvious way to deny (2) is to reject Burge's main conclu-
 sion and argue that he has made some mistake in attributing contents to
 Oscar, either in the actual or counterfactual situation. If Oscar does not
 actually think that he has arthritis in the thigh, then we cannot say that
 b occurs in the counterfactual situation. If there is no such thought, then
 our stipulation in (1) fails to secure a referent for "b." And if Burge is
 mistaken in describing the counterfactual situation, then we can say that
 in that situation, Oscar does have a thought with the relevant content.
 One obvious way to deny (3) goes like this. First we suppose that
 there are two kinds of content: "narrow content" and "wide content."
 The idea is supposed to be that while the wide contents of Oscar's
 thought differ in the actual and counterfactual situations, the narrow
 content remains the same. So we reject (3) when the content under
 discussion is wide content but accept a reformulation that is restricted
 to narrow content. Since the contents that differ are wide, the argument
 needs to make reference to this sort of content in (3) to make trouble
 for an identity theory.
 Neither of these will be my strategy. I take it that Burge has suffi-
 ciently blocked the first strategy in the main part of his paper. And the
 second strategy leaves us with the obligation to provide an account of
 "narrow content," but I am sceptical that such an account can be given.
 More importantly, however, neither strategy gets to the heart of the
 problem. The conflict between content essentialism, the view that
 thoughts have the same content in every world in which they occur, and
 a token identity theory is much more direct than Burge's argument
 suggests. To see the conflict, consider the following argument.
 (6) This particular neural sequence could have had a different
 content.
 (7) Oscar's thought at t that he has arthritis in the thigh is this
 particular neural sequence.
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 (8) Therefore, Oscar's thought at t that he has arthritis in the
 thigh could have had a different content.
 First a word about the logical form of (6) and (8). "This particular
 neural sequence" and "Oscar's thought at t that he has arthritis in the
 thigh" are in purely referential position. In each sentence, the predicate
 denies that the relevant event has its content essentially. Now a token
 identity theory will entail that some sentence like (7) is true and that
 neural sequences have contents. So given an identity theory, (6) is
 perfectly obvious regardless of what "kind" of content is at issue. As a
 matter of fact, the neural event stands in all sorts of interesting and
 important relations to inputs, outputs, other states of the brain, and the
 rest of the world. On just about any account of content, it has the
 content that it does in virtue of standing in these relations. But if these
 relations are contingent, if the event could have occurred without
 standing in those relations, then the neural event could have had a
 different content or no content at all.
 Of course, in the above argument, we simply assume an identity
 theory. We could just as easily have assumed content essentialism and
 argued against an identity theory. The point of the argument is simply
 to show that the conflict between the two views does not depend on a
 particular conception of content. Unlike Burge's argument, this argu-
 ment rests on a very minimal claim about the determination of content.
 All we need to assume about content is that if thoughts are neural
 events, then the content of the thought is determined by contingent
 relations between the event and something else. We need not take any
 stand on the relevance of relations to things outside the individual to
 whom the thought is ascribed. A rejection of wide content is not
 sufficient. We must reject either content essentialism or an identity
 theory.
 We have, however, some independent grounds for accepting a token
 identity theory.' We ordinarily assume that our thoughts, our beliefs
 and desires, cause much of our behavior. So suppose a mental event m,
 a belief and desire pair, causes me to move my arm in a certain way,
 e.g., to reach for a glass of water. Assuming the closure of the physical,
 there will be some physical event p which causes this physical event of
 my moving my arm. Now either m and p are each independently
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 sufficient causes for my moving my arm, in which case we have over-
 determination, or m and p are both necessary and only jointly suffi-
 cient, in which case we violate the closure of the physical, or m is
 identical to p. Using this sort of argument by elimination, we arrive at a
 token identity theory.
 My strategy to motivate the denial of (3) is to look at the role
 content essentialism plays in our thinking about the mental. First of all,
 as we have seen, it conflicts fairly directly with an identity theory which
 we have some reason to accept. But I will argue that we have no reason
 to accept content essentialism and that the view itself really does no
 work. I will begin with some considerations about individuation. We
 will see that our ordinary ideas and practices concerning the individua-
 tion of thoughts do not entail essentialism. This means first of all, these
 ideas and practices provide no grounds for content essentialism, and
 secondly, that we can reject the essentialism without altering or replac-
 ing the ideas or practices. Next we will look at a familiar view of events
 which may be taken to suggest, but does not entail, content essentialism.
 This view is faulty for reasons having nothing to do with the mental and
 should be revised. The revised view of events lends no support whatso-
 ever to content essentialism. If anything, it makes it more suspicious.
 Finally, I will look at certain intuitions which have motivated the idea of
 narrow content. These intuitions should be taken as reasons to reject
 content essentialism rather than reasons to believe in narrow content.
 II
 We are introduced to content essentialism through a criterion of
 identity, or principle of individuation, for thoughts. The standard, or
 most common way, of referring to a token thought is to refer to the
 person to whom it occurs and the time and content of the event.
 Furthermore, it is an implicit part of our ordinary practice of thought
 attribution that thought x and thought y are the same (token) thought
 just in case x and y occur to the same person at the same time and have
 the same content. As Burge says,
 If person, time, and content are the same, we would normally count the thought event
 the same. If any one of these parameters differs in descriptions of thought events ...,
 then the events or occurrences described are different.6
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 Let's assume that this is correct. The problem is that Burge moves from
 a criterion of identity to an essentialist premise:
 Now one might codify and generalize this point by holding that no occurrence of a
 thought ... could have a different ... content and be the very same token event.7
 Clearly, we can't get essentialism from a criterion of identity. Suppose
 that we individuate objects in the following way: x and y are the same
 physical object just in case they are in the same place at the same time.
 We do not infer from this that physical objects have their places
 essentially. And the Identity of Indiscernibles does not entail that
 objects have all their properties essentially.8
 It could be that Burge intends his remarks as a cross-world criterion
 of identity for thoughts, which would have the form "If x and y are
 thoughts, then x in world 1 is y in world 2 iff x and y occur to the same
 person at the same time and have the same content." This criterion
 would entail content essentialism, but it is not clear that it is implicit in
 our ordinary practices of thought attribution. This criterion is actually
 stronger than content essentialism, since it also entails subject and
 temporal essentialism. But consider a detective recounting the thought
 processes that lead to the apprehension of a criminal. "It suddenly
 occurred to me that something was out of place on the piano. If that
 had happened just a few seconds later, it would have been too late to
 stop the culprit." The most straightforward semantic analysis of the
 second sentence takes "that" to refer to the mental event reported in
 the first sentence. The point of the second sentence, on this analysis, is
 to say what would have happened if that event had occurred a few
 seconds later. If it is possible for this sentence to be nonvacuously true
 on this analysis, then it must be possible for a mental event to occur
 slightly later than it actually does. So if this is the correct analysis of the
 second sentence, the cross-world criterion is false.
 Of course, a more complicated analysis can be provided. "That" may
 be a disguised description or a "pronoun of laziness," and the recovered
 description can be given narrow scope with respect to the modal
 operator. On this analysis, we have the detective saying what would
 have happened if an event of the same sort had occurred slightly later.
 Ordinary language by itself gives us no reason to complicate our
 semantic analysis in this way. If there are reasons for the complication,
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 they must be metaphysical reasons concerning what is and what is not
 essential to events. But if the cross-world criterion requires an argu-
 ment, and any argument for the criterion would be, in part, an argu-
 ment for content essentialism, it does not help to start with the criterion
 and hope to get essentialism from that.
 A principle of individuation, or criterion of identity, does not entail
 essentialism, and a cross-world criterion is itself in need of support.
 There is, however, another sense in which we individuate thoughts in
 terms of their contents. We ordinarily type individuate or classify
 thoughts in the following way: If x and y are thoughts, they are of the
 same kind if they have the same content. Of course we can type indi-
 viduate a group of objects in any number of ways. But for a number of
 purposes, including explanations and generalizations in both folk and
 scientific psychology, as well as conveying and relaying information,
 type individuation in terms of content is dominant. So, in addition to
 what attitude a person takes toward a content (believing, desiring, and
 so on), the content properties of a thought are among the most impor-
 tant to us for type individuation.
 Type individuation of thoughts in terms of content lends no more
 support to content essentialism than token individuation, i.e., a criterion
 of identity. Consider an analogy. We know that two things are the same
 kind of artifact if they have the same functions(s) or purpose(s). We
 know this just by thinking about what an artifact is, just as we know that
 thoughts are of the same kind if they have the same content by thinking
 about what a thought is. But first of all, we do not infer from this fact
 about artifacts that they have their functions essentially. This thing,
 which happens to be a table, could have been produced for a very
 different purpose, perhaps as a purely decorative art object. Of course,
 it is a necessary truth that if something is a table, it has this particular
 function or purpose. But it is the conditional as a whole that is neces-
 sary. If we are interested in the essential properties of individuals, we
 are concerned with de re necessity. In fact, we need the necessitation of
 the consequent, and this is not forthcoming from the necessity of the
 conditional unless we suppose that being a table is an essential property.
 Secondly, being a table is a relational property.9 It does not locally
 supervene on the physical properties of tables because whether or not
 you have this property is partly determined by the intentions of your
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 creator which may in turn involve a wider social context. It follows that
 table talk, and artifact talk generally, cannot be reduced to talk about
 the intrinsic physical properties of objects, just as thought talk cannot
 be reduced to talk about the intrinsic physical properties of brains. But
 this failure of reduction does not by itself keep us from identifying this
 table with the chunk of matter of which it is composed. Barring certain
 unrelated problems about identity through time, we can say that every
 token table is identical with some chunk of matter even though the
 property of being a table is not reducible to and does not even super-
 vene on the intrinsic properties of that chunk of matter.
 In the case of artifacts, the situation is quite clear. Our most ordinary
 descriptions and type individuation of artifacts involves a nonessential,
 relational property of them. But even though relations to things outside
 of a room go into making a thing a table, we have no trouble identifying
 the table with something inside the room. This, at least, is one clear
 case of identity without local supervenience. In the case of thoughts,
 then, it makes sense to suppose that Oscar's thought (at t) that he has
 arthritis in the thigh is a neurological event in his brain even though the
 property of being a thought that one has arthritis in the thigh does not
 supervene on the (internal) neurological properties of the brain. Again,
 our ordinary descriptions and type individuation of thoughts involves
 their content properties. But though things outside of the brain go into
 making a thought have a certain content, we may be able to identify the
 thought with something inside the brain.
 The claim that we individuate thoughts in terms of their contents can
 be taken in a number of ways. If we spell this out in terms of a criterion
 of identity, it is true but lends no support to content essentialism. If we
 spell it out in terms of a cross-world criterion of identity, it is at least as
 controversial, if not more controversial than content essentialism. So if
 we are looking for reasons to believe content essentialism, this under-
 standing of the claim will not help. And if we spell out the claim about
 individuation in terms of a principle of classification, or in terms of type
 individuation, this also lends no support to essentialism. Without an
 altemative reading of the claim, it is safe to assume at this point that
 considerations concerning individuation are irrelevant to content essen-
 tialism. Let's tum to some general considerations about events and how
 we identify them.
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 III
 The standard way of referring to a token thought is to refer to the
 person to whom it occurs and the time and content of the event. This
 can be taken as evidence for various principles of individuation. But the
 principles do not help the essentialist cause. But perhaps our ordinary
 means of identifying thoughts can lend more direct support to content
 essentialism. Suppose we adopt the following two theses about events
 and their names.
 (E) Events are property exemplifications.
 This is usually taken to involve, among other things, the following
 criterion of identity for events. The event of an object x having property
 P at time t is the same event as y having P' at t' just in case x = y, t = t',
 and P = P'.10 The property exemplified by the object at the time is
 called the constitutive property of the event, and the object which
 exemplifies this property is the subject of the event.
 (N) Our ordinary descriptions of events typically contain predi-
 cates which express the constitutive properties of the events
 to which they refer.
 For example, "the party we had at Timothy's last night" will refer to an
 event whose constitutive property is having a party. The group of
 people there will be the subject.
 Since we typically refer to thoughts using descriptions which involve
 the content of the thought (e.g. "Oscar's thought that he has arthritis in
 the thigh"), the conjunction of (E) and (N) entails that when we talk
 about thoughts, we typically refer to events that have content properties
 as constituents. Of course, this view no more entails content essen-
 tialism than any criterion of identity entails the corresponding essen-
 tialist claim. But the following sort of reasoning is seductive. If the event
 is nothing over and above the individual having the property at the
 time, then how could the same event in another possible world be the
 exemplification of a different property?
 I think the move from "nothing over and above" to essentialism can
 be resisted in general. But in this case, I think we should resist the idea
 that content properties are constituents of events. This is entailed by the
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 conjunction of (E) and (N), but we have independent reasons to reject
 this conjunction. In particular, we should reject (N). Without the
 conjunction, we have no reason to think that contents are constituents
 of thoughts, and the replacement view of events makes sense of the
 denial of content essentialism.
 Attractive as it is, the conjunction of (E) and (N) has some serious
 defects. For example, it entails that there are a great many more events
 occurring at any particular place and time than we would normally
 think.a1 Any definite description which expresses a property distinct
 from having a party will, on this view, refer to an event distinct from
 the party we had at Timothy's, even if the subject and time are the
 same. We may try to refer to that party using such descriptions as "the
 dance party Timmy threw" or even "Lisa's birthday party." Since this
 latter description, for example, expresses the property of having a
 birthday party, and since this property is distinct from the property of
 having a party, the two descriptions refer to events with distinct con-
 stitutive properties, i.e., to distinct events.
 We know that Lisa's birthday party was the only party we had at
 Timothy's last night. But the conjunction of (E) and (N) entails that
 there were a number of events occurring at Timothy's last night, all of
 which happened to be parties. There was the birthday party, the dance
 party, and the good time had by all. It should be possible for people to
 use these different descriptions to refer to the same event. So either (E),
 or (N), or both must go. Now we can reject (N) without rejecting (E),
 but we cannot reject (E) without rejecting (N). We cannot hold that
 definite descriptions of events refer in virtue of expressing constitutive
 properties unless we know what a constitutive property is. But our only
 account of constitutive properties is contained in (E). So (N) must go
 either way, either alone or along with (E).
 Rejecting (E) along with (N) involves producing a replacement. But
 (E)'s main competitor, the view of events as regions of space-time, has
 difficulties of its own."2 On the other hand, (N) is independently
 suspicious. According to (N), our definite descriptions of events func-
 tion in a radically different manner from our definite descriptions of
 objects, properties, and points in time. "The table in this room" refers
 to an individual that has a certain property, the property of being the
 only table in the room. If we have a unified treatment of definite
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 descriptions, "the party we had at Timothy's last night" should refer to
 an individual that has a certain property, the property of being the only
 party we had at Timothy's last night. The individual that has this
 property is an event, and the same event can have the property of being
 Lisa's birthday party. According to (N), on the other hand, the former
 description refers in virtue of expressing the property of having a party,
 and this property is had by a group of people.
 The rejection of (N) is sufficient to avoid the multiplication of events.
 "The dance party that Timmy threw was Lisa's birthday party" is true
 because the two descriptions are coreferential. Finding a replacement
 for (N) is simple: treat descriptions of events in the same way you treat
 other descriptions. That is, we should replace (N) with (D).
 (D) An event description of the form "the F" refers to the only
 (contextually relevant) event which is F.
 Here the distinction between a Fregean and Russellian account of
 descriptions is irrelevant. In both cases, descriptions refer in virtue of
 properties exemplified by the referent. If the referent is an event, we
 should be concerned with properties of the event, like being fun, and
 lasting all night, rather than the constitutive properties of the event
 which are properties exemplified by the subject of the event.
 So events are property exemplifications, but not every event name
 contains a predicate which expresses the constitutive property of the
 event to which it refers. We can think of constitutive properties as
 highly complex and specific. As Bennett says, P is the constitutive
 property of an event e when "the whole intrinsic truth about e is that it
 is an instance of P."13 For "instance," you can read "exemplification."
 An instance of a property is not the individual that exemplifies it but
 the exemplification by the individual. This has also been called a
 "trope."
 "The party we had at Timothy's last night" refers to an event whose
 constitutive property is not the property of having a party, but rather a
 far more complex property which will determine, given the relevant
 contextual information, who said what to whom and when. A far more
 interesting and descriptive name could refer to the same event even if it
 contained predicates which expressed properties that are not even
 coextensive with the property of having a party. In fact, if constitutive
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 properties are this complex and specific, we will very rarely, if ever, use
 names which express their constitutive properties. But this should not
 be too surprising. Our names and descriptions of individuals or pro-
 perties rarely, if ever, reveal the whole intrinsic truth about them. "The
 property of being round" does not tell us what it is to be round; "the
 color of my true love's hair" tells us little or nothing about the intrinsic
 nature of that color; and "the table in this room" says nothing about the
 constituents of the table. There is no reason to believe that descriptions
 of events are any different.
 If constitutive properties of events are this complex and specific, we
 caniiot, in general, read them off of our ordinary descriptions of
 events.14 But this does not mean that we cannot discover those con-
 stitutive properties. If all you know about the table in this room is that
 it is a table and that it is in this room, you know next to nothing about
 its constituents. It could be made of wood, or steel, or glass. To know
 about the constituents, you need more than an ordinary description;
 you need to investigate. If all you know about the party last night at
 Timothy's is that it was a party at Timothy's, you know nothing about
 its constituents. But if you were there, you would have a much better
 idea of its constituents.
 A party, of course, is a complex affair, and consists of a number of
 things going on at once. One of the many things that went on was Jack
 and Diane flirting in the corner. They could have flirted in any number
 of ways. But what the flirting actually consisted of was, among other
 things, her saying just that in just that way. Her saying it that way, in
 turn, consisted of her making certain sounds. The sounds could have
 meant something different in a different language, just as her tone of
 voice could have suggested something different in a different cultural
 environment. But there should not be any difficulty in separating the
 event, her making certain sounds, from the contextual factors that give
 the event a certain significance.
 Also, the constitutive property of an event is in general logically
 independent of the property expressed by the predicates in our ordi-
 nary descriptions of events. Consider the constitutive property of
 Timothy's party. This highly specific property is surely not necessary
 for being a party. A different party could have had different people
 saying different things. But if constitutive properties exhaust and are
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 exhausted by the intrinsic nature of their events, then the constitutive
 properties of many events will not entail the property involved in our
 ordinary event descriptions. To suppose otherwise, as Bennett does,15 is
 to suppose that our ordinary event descriptions refer only in virtue of
 the intrinsic properties of events. But this is clearly not the case. There
 need not be an intrinsic difference between opening night and dress
 rehearsal. An event is an opening night largely in virtue of its temporal
 relations to other events. Something is a christening of a ship rather
 than performance art or simple vandalism because it takes place in a
 certain social context. Think of all the social, cultural, and historical
 relations necessary to make something a wedding.16
 Regardless of the importance of their relational properties, we have
 no trouble locating these events in space and time. The wedding started
 around noon and took place in a church on Elmwood Avenue. At least
 in many cases, we have no trouble distinguishing the event from the
 customs, traditions, and historical events which are necessary for the
 event to have a certain property, i.e., being a wedding. We do not think
 that the event is spread out in space and time so that we include in the
 event all of the relations necessary to make it a wedding. Otherwise, it
 would not start at noon or take place in a church. Even though things
 outside of a church go into making something a wedding, we have no
 trouble locating and identifying the wedding with something inside the
 church.
 So, events are property exemplifications. The constitutive properties
 of events determine the intrinsic nature of the event. But descriptions of
 events function the same way other descriptions function. The predi-
 cates in the descriptions express properties had by the event (e.g., being
 a wedding) rather than constitutive properties which are had by the
 constitutive objects (e.g., getting married). Often, the properties ex-
 pressed by the descriptions are relational, and even nonessential,
 properties of the event (e.g., being the first party of the summer). But if
 descriptions of events refer in exactly the same way that other descrip-
 tions refer, there is no problem referring to events using relational,
 nonessential properties. "The table in this room" refers to an individual
 partly in virtue of that individual standing in a certain contingent
 relation to a room.
 Applying this view to thoughts is quite straightforward. According to
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 (E) and (D), we can say that "Oscar's thought that p at t" refers to a
 property exemplifcation, but the property exemplified by Oscar is
 highly complex and specific. If Oscar's thought has some purely intrin-
 sic phenomenological properties, these can be included in the constitu-
 tive property of the event even though these properties are neither
 necessary nor sufficient for a thought to have that content. If the
 thought has some biological basis, this too can be included in the
 constitutive property regardless of its independence of the content
 property. What is important to the constitutive property is that it
 determine the intrinsic nature of the event. And while this intrinsic
 nature may be discovered through philosophical reflection or through
 empirical research, it will not be discovered by reflecting on our
 ordinary descriptions of the events.
 So, "Oscar's thought that p at t" refers to an event in virtue of that
 event's having a certain content and occurring to Oscar at a certain
 time. These are properties of the event. They need not have anything to
 do with the constitutive properties of the event. In fact, if event descrip-
 tions function like other descriptions, it makes sense to suppose that at
 least some of the properties in virtue of which the description refers are
 relational, or even, nonessential. So the rejection of content essentialism
 fits quite nicely with an independently motivated account of events and
 event descriptions. And the rejection does not require any serious
 modification in our thinking about the mental. It does not, for example,
 require an alternative principle of individuation for thoughts, or an
 alternative way of referring to thoughts.
 Finally, a further difficulty with the conjunction of (E) and (N) is that
 it rules out the possibility of nonreductive materialism. According to
 (N), "Oscar's thought that p at t" will refer to an event whose con-
 stitutive property is thinking that p. According to (E), no event is
 identical to this event unless it is an exemplification of the same prop-
 erty. In particular, we cannot say that this thought is the event of some
 brain having some neurological property unless that neurological
 property is the property of thinking that p. In other words, there is no
 token identity without type identity. But it is reasonable to prefer a
 general theory of events which leaves nonreductive materialism open as
 an interesting philosophical possibility. Of course, the conjunction of
 (E) and (D) does not entail nonreductive materialism, but it does leave
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 the possibility open. I take it that this is a further reason to prefer (D)
 to (N).
 IV
 So far, my argument against content essentialism has been in terms of
 economics: its acceptance is costly; its rejection is cheap. The price of
 content essentialism is the rejection of an identity theory. Burge's
 argument ((1) to (5)) from content essentialism against an identity
 theory and my argument ((6) to (8)) from an identity theory against
 content essentialism show the conflict between the two views. We
 cannot have both. I have tried to show that giving up content essen-
 tialism does not involve giving up much else. And the proposed view of
 events is intended to make sense of the rejection. Given the importance
 of relational, nonessential properties in our talk about weddings and
 parties, not to mention tables and chairs, the importance of content
 properties in our talk about mental events should not lead us to essen-
 tialism.
 But in addition to this sort of reason, we have some intuitive motiva-
 tion for rejecting content essentialism. Suppose you look at a table and
 say, "That table is brown." According to the best semantics we have for
 indexicals,17 you express a singular proposition: the proposition has the
 table itself as a constituent. Now if you believe what you say, if what is
 said is what is believed, then the content of your thought is the same
 singular proposition. Given the weli known difficulties with description
 theories, this is the most plausible characterization of the content of
 your thought. So for these theoretical reasons, we conclude that the
 actual object of reference is a constituent of the content of the thought.
 The narrow content intuitions, however, do have some initial plau-
 sibility. According to this view, the very same thought could have
 occurred even if that table never existed. I think we should accept this
 claim but refuse to draw the moral which is usually drawn. The narrow
 content theorist, assuming content essentialism, concludes that there
 must be some other conception of content which does not involve
 external objects as constituents. But as far as I know, no plausible
 substitute has been proposed which deserves to be called content. Now
 if the same thought could have occurred without the table, but could
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 not have had the same content without the table, then the thought does
 not have its content essentially. By rejecting content essentialism, we
 can grant the intuitive motivation for the narrow content project
 without thereby accepting the project itself.
 Similar remarks hold for the predicative components of thoughts.
 According to the narrow content intuitions, my recent thought that
 water is wet could have occurred even if no samples of water ever
 existed. The wide content theorist can accept this claim of ontological
 independence. Such a theorist is only committed to the necessity of the
 following conditional: If a thought has, in a certain world, the content
 that water is wet, then there must be some samples of water in that
 world. Without content essentialism, there is nothing wrong with saying
 that the thought that water is wet occurs in a world without water but
 does not have, in that world, the content that water is wet. "The thought
 that water is wet" refers, in the actual world, to an event in virtue of its
 having a certain content in this world. If we reject content essentialism,
 we can refer to the event in this way and talk about the same event in a
 world in which it has a different content. There is nothing more
 mysterious about this than asking about what would have happened to
 the table in this room if it had been outside.
 If we accept the independence claim, the claim that my thought that
 water is wet could have occurred even if no samples of water ever
 existed, without accepting narrow content, we must reject content
 essentialism. According to the independence claim, the same thought
 could occur in a world without water. According to the wide content
 theorist, the thought could not have, in that world, the content that
 water is wet. If the same thought could occur without having that
 content, then the thought does not have the same content in every
 world in which it exists. So content properties are nonessential. So the
 narrow content intuitions, as I understand them, together with a truth
 conditional conception of content entail the rejection of content essen-
 tialism.
 The narrow content intuitions can be used in an argument against
 content essentialism. To anyone who is moved by the intuitions but has
 theoretical difficulties with the idea of narrow content, this is a good
 reason to reject content essentialism. And these reasons have nothing to
 do with physicalism. But even those who deny having the relevant
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 intuitions, or who deny their relevance or importance, cannot deny the
 widespread existence of these intuitions in others. Such a theorist, it
 seems, requires some sort of explanation for why so many people have
 these intuitions. The theorist can say that all of these people are just
 wrong in their intuitions. But a more plausible explanation is that the
 intuition is correct, but that the narrow content theorist has drawn the
 wrong moral from these intuitions. The denial of content essentialism
 gives us such an explanation of these intuitions.
 v
 It seems that the identity theorist would want to say something like this.
 Each mental event is a physical event. It has mental properties, and it
 has physical properties. Now if it makes sense to talk about some
 particular event and to ask for its essential properties, we might want to
 say that the event's essential properties are a subset of its physical
 properties. Maybe we believe in the primacy of the physical in some
 strong sense. Not only is every event a physical event, but the physical
 properties of an event make it the event that it is. This is compatible
 with the claim that some of these events will also have mental proper-
 ties contingently, and even that these properties are not reducible to
 physical properties. We can have physicalist essentialism without reduc-
 tion or an alternative principle of individuation. It is just that with
 thoughts, as with tables and weddings, the most natural way to refer to
 and type individuate them is in terms of relational, nonessential proper-
 ties, in the case of thoughts, their content properties. Perhaps such an
 essentialist view could not be used in an argument for the identity
 theory. But it is a consistent position. To deny the possibility of such a
 position, as Burge does when he assumes content essentialism, neglects
 one plausible alternative open to the identity theorist.
 The view I am presenting, then, says that each token mental event is
 a physical, neural event in an individual and that the content properties
 of these events are nonessential properties of the events. The very same
 thought could have had a different content. This view seems to be open
 to the following objection. Consider Oscar's thought that he has
 arthritis in the thigh. This thought is false. Now consider the very same
 thought in Burge's counterfactual situation in which Oscar has the very
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 same diseases. On my view, the very same thought is true. What
 accounts for this difference in truth value if the relevant facts about
 Oscar's thigh remain the same?
 The answer is not very hard to find. Consider the sentence "George
 Bush is the President of the US in 1992." This sentence is a physical
 object, a syntactic string. It has its meaning, or content properties,
 nonessentially. It could have meant something other than what it does.
 As things stand, the sentence is true. But there are two different kinds
 of situation in which it is false. First, George Bush might not have been
 President. But even if we keep all the facts about Bush and the Presi-
 dency fixed, a situation in which the sentence is false is one in which it
 means that snow is green. This is exactly what happens to Oscar's
 thought. It changes its truth value not because of a change in the things
 that it is about but because it is about different things.
 Burge discusses a similar analogy in a footnote."8 But he discusses
 the view that contents are sentences which is certainly not my view. The
 relevant difficulty he has with an analogy between thoughts and sen-
 tences is that sentences can be identified independently of their con-
 tents while it is not obvious that thoughts can. It is not clear what
 relevance identification has to essentialism. If it is spelled out in terms
 of individuation or in terms of our ordinary descriptions, I hope to have
 shown that identification has nothing to do with essentialism.
 Finally, suppose that Burge is right that relations between the
 individual and the environment are relevant to the determination of
 content. On the one hand, we might say that the event that is Oscar's
 thought is in some sense spread out onto the world both spatially and
 temporally.'9 This way, all of the relevant relations between Oscar and
 the environment are already part of the event and we do not have to
 posit any essential relational properties of the event. On the other hand,
 we might just say that Oscar's thought is an internal neural event which
 is type individuated by nonessential relational properties. I think that
 when you come right down to it, the second option is far more plau-
 sible.
 For most of this paper, I have been trying to motivate the rejection
 of content essentialism. First of all, content essentialism is incompatible
 with a token identity theory with or without wide content, and we have
 independent reasons for accepting such an identity theory. Secondly,
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 the rejection of content essentialism provides us with an explanation for
 the narrow content intuitions without committing us to a rejection of a
 truth conditional conception of content. Finally, according to an
 independently motivated view of events and event descriptions, it
 makes perfect sense to suppose that contents are not constitutive of
 thoughts. If contents are not constitutive of thoughts, there is much less
 temptation to think of them as essential and probably more temptation
 to think of them as relational and nonessential. Although I grant that
 there is a certain intuitive plausibility to the idea that thoughts have
 their contents essentially, I think that upon reflection, we should reject
 that idea. It could be that much of the idea's plausibility derives from
 certain considerations concerning individuation or identification. But as
 we have seen, these considerations really lend no support to content
 essentialism.
 If we do reject content essentialism, we can understand how thoughts
 can be individuated in terms of a property which involves relations to
 things outside of a person while the thoughts themselves are completely
 internal to the person. We can have externalist descriptions of internal
 events because the properties used in the description are nonessential.
 And this leaves open the possibility of identity without supervenience.
 A thought is a neurological event in a person, but the content proper-
 ties of that thought do not supervene on the intrinsic neurological
 properties of that event.20
 NOTES
 See "Mental Events," in Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Oxford University
 Press, 1980), p. 209.
 2 Davidson, p. 21 1.
 I Tyler Burge, "Individualism and the Mental," Midwest Studies in Philosophy vol. 4,
 French et al. eds. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979).
 4 Burge, pp. 110-111.
 This argument is taken from Jaegwon Kim's "Dretske on How Reasons Explain
 Behavior" in Dretske and His Critics, Brian McLaughlin ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
 1990).
 6 Burge, p. 111. We should add attitude type (belief, desire, etc.) to this list.
 7 Burge, p. 111.
 8 This lack of entailment has been pointed out before. See James Van Cleve, "Why a
 Set Contains its Members Essentially," Nous, 19 (1985): 585-602, and Lawrence
 Lombard, Events: A Metaphysical Study (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986),
 pp. 187-189. The logic of the situation is fairly straightforward. A criterion of identity
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 has the following form: If x and y are things of kind K, then x is y iff x and y share
 certain relevant properties. The conjunction of Leibniz' laws is the most general such
 criterion. But if we pick the right kind K, we can often find a proper subset of proper-
 ties which is both necessary and sufficient for identity. So for thoughts, the relevant
 properties are content properties, attitude type properties (being a belief, desire, etc.),
 subject properties (occurring to Frank Sinatra etc.), and temporal properties. Letting
 "P" range over just these properties and letting "Tx" mean that x is a thought, we have
 (TH):
 (TH) o (x)(y)[(Tx & Ty) - (x = y -(P)(Px Py))]
 Now we are trying to get from this to content essentialism. So we need something like
 "0 Ca" where C is some particular content property. So now we instantiate and assume
 that a and b are thoughts. But with a necessary conditional and its antecedent we only
 get the consequent, not the necessitation of the consequent. So let's assume that a and b
 are essentially thoughts. Of course, a hard line materialist would want to deny this. But
 for the sake of the argument, and for the moment, let's assume it. This gives us the
 necessitation of the antecedent, and from this and (TH) we get
 0 (a = b (P)(Pa Pb))
 Now we assume that a is b. And since "a" and "b" are rigid, this is a necessary truth.
 This gives us the necessitation of the right side of the biconditional. By instantiating for
 "P" we get
 (CE?) 0 (Ca Cb)
 This is about as close as (TH) will get us to content essentialism, but it is not very close.
 We have already assumed that a is b and that "a" and "b" are rigid. So (CE?) basically
 says that a has a certain property iff it has that property. And this is true, but it clearly
 does not entail that it has that property essentially or even that it has it at all. Of course,
 we can assume "Ca" but this will only give us "Cb." What we want is "0 Cb." And the
 only way we can get from (CE?) to that is to assume "0 Ca." In effect, to get from
 (CE?) to content essentialism you need to assume content essentialism.
 Let's say that a property P is a relational property of an individual x iff the proposi-
 tion that x is P entails that there exists an individual y which is wholly distinct from x.
 An individual y is wholly distinct from x iff y is not x, and y is not a proper part of x,
 and y does not share a proper part in common with x. I will use both "intrinsic" and
 "internal" to describe properties that are not relational.
 10 Jaegwon Kim, "Events as Property Exemplifications," in Action Theory, Brand and
 Walton eds. (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1976), p. 161.
 11 Jonathan Bennett discusses this objection in Events and Their Names (Indianapolis:
 Hackett, 1988), pp. 78-82.
 12 Again, see Bennett, pp. 119-122.
 13 Bennett, p. 93.
 14 Similar remarks go for the relation between event descriptions and the subjects of
 the events described. "The dance party at Timmy's" does not tell you who was there.
 15 Bennett,p. 128.
 16 If you like stories about intrinsically indistinguishable doubles, consider this. In the
 actual world, a wedding takes place, the minister having been ordained, and so legally
 licensed to marry people, though the mail. In the counterfactual situation, the mail
 order ordination company is a fraud, and so the minister is not actually ordained. So in
 the actual world, a legal wedding takes place, but the intrinsically indistinguishable
 event in the counterfactual situation is not legally a wedding. Since the minister in the
 counterfactual situation does not know she is not ordained, there is no difference in the
 actions, beliefs, or intentions of anyone involved. Perhaps more complicated stories can
This content downloaded from 129.67.246.57 on Fri, 02 Nov 2018 18:49:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 IDENTITY WITHOUT SUPERVENIENCE 79
 be told in which in the counterfactual situation, an intrinsically indistinguishable event,
 or perhaps the very same event, takes place in a culture with different customs and
 practices, and so the event is not a wedding.
 17 David Kaplan, "Demonstratives" in Themes From Kaplan, Almog et al. eds.
 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 481-563.
 18 Burge, p. 121, note 15.
 19 Colin McGinn seems to believe that thoughts, and the mind itself, are spread out in
 this way. See, for example, Mental Content (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989).
 20 I would like to thank Tyler Burge, Jaegwon Kim, Ernie Sosa, and an anonymous
 reader from Philosophical Studies for helpful comments on earlier versions of this
 paper.
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